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Thank you, Thom [Lambert], for that kind introduction. I am delighted to be 
part of this conference, but am sorry that I cannot be there in person. 
I had high expectations when I picked up [How to Regulate: A Guide for Pol-
icymakers] shortly after it first came out several years ago.
1
 Those expectations 
were exceeded by the clear and compelling way in which the book wrestles with 
the difficulties faced by regulators as they seek to design regulations that solve 
problems without creating larger problems in the process. As the book explains, 
―regulation… always involves trade-offs. The $64,000 question is how policy-
makers should proceed to ensure that they strike those trade-offs in a manner that 
creates as much social welfare as possible.‖2 I appreciate the book even more now 
that I am sitting in a regulator‘s seat. Incidentally, as a regulator, I must give the 
standard disclaimer that the views I express today are my own and do not neces-
sarily represent those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or my fellow 
Commissioners. 
Entrepreneurship and innovation do not have the happiest of relationships 
with regulation. Regulators get used to dealing with the existing players in an 
industry, and those players tend to have teams of people dedicated to dealing with 
regulators. Entrepreneurs trying to start something new are often much more fo-
cused on that new thing than on how it fits into a regulator‘s dog-eared rulebook. 
Regulators, for their part, tend to be skeptical of change because its consequences 
are difficult to foresee and figuring out how it fits into existing regulatory frame-
works is difficult. 
Society, however, often pushes regulators to accept change. After all, society 
benefits from entrepreneurs‘ imaginative approaches to solving problems and 
willingness to go out on a limb with a new idea. Society welcomes innovations 
that make our lives easier, more enjoyable, and more productive. In many sectors, 
therefore, entrepreneurship and innovation evoke overwhelmingly positive re-
sponses. 
In the financial industry, entrepreneurship and innovation do not always face 
such a warm reception. Financial innovations, for example, were fingered by some 
as the cause of the last financial crisis. Former Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul 
Volcker, in a negative post-crisis appraisal of financial innovation, concluded that: 
The most important financial innovation that I have seen the past 20 
years is the automatic teller machine . . . . How many other innovations 
can you tell me of that have been as important to the individual as the au-
tomatic teller machine, which is more of a mechanical innovation than a 
financial one? I have found very little evidence that vast amounts of in-
novation in financial markets in recent years has had a visible effect on 
the productivity of the economy . . . .
3
 
                                                          
 1. See THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS (2017). 
 2. Id. at 10. 
 3. The Only Thing Useful Banks Have Invented in 20 Years is the ATM, NY POST (Dec. 13, 2009), 
www.nypost.com/2009/12/13/the-only-thing-useful-banks-have-invented-in-20-years-is-the-atm (re-
printing Chairman Paul Volcker‘s comments from the Wall Street Journal Future of Finance Initiative). 
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Some people might disagree with Chairman Volcker. Take for example the 
man who got stuck inside an ATM a couple years ago.
4
 In the course of repairing 
the machine, he got locked inside it. Without a cellphone or any other obvious 
way to contact the outside world, he was stuck. It is good that he thought to slip 
written pleas for help to undoubtedly baffled customers. Instead of a receipt, cus-
tomers got a note reading ―Please help. I‘m stuck in here and I don‘t have my 
phone. Please call my boss at . . . ―5 A customer heeded the call, and the police 
rescued the repairman. 
The moral of the story is that every innovation—even one that almost every-
one agrees is good—carries with it some risk. Some people may get hurt by the 
innovation in ways we would never have imagined. Others may be helped by the 
innovation in ways we would never have imagined. Some people will use the 
innovation in ways we wish they would not. We would be better off without some 
innovations, but we might not know that until after enough time has passed to see 
the harm they cause. In other instances, the true value of an innovation may not 
come to light for years. 
Technological progress in the financial industry offers the same mix of hope, 
promise, and risk that technological progress in other parts of our society offers. 
As regulators, therefore, we must allow innovation to proceed, even as we put in 
reasonable safeguards and watch for unanticipated consequences. 
The SEC‘s attitude toward innovation is important because we regulate an in-
dustry that is a key gatekeeper for progress and productivity in the rest of the 
economy. The United States has benefited greatly from the relative importance of 
non-bank financing. Without the funds that the capital markets provide, compa-
nies in other sectors of the economy would not be able to explore new ideas and 
develop new products and processes. As a regulator, when I think about protecting 
the public, I think not only of protecting investors, but also of ensuring that the 
capital markets are able to serve the rest of the economy without undue barriers. 
Because of the central role the markets we regulate play in ensuring that the 
rest of the economy is funded, we need to be open to innovations that will make 
the capital markets function better and serve parts of the population that were 
previously not able to access those markets. Can we, for example, look for ways 
for unaccredited investors to pool their resources to invest in private companies? 
Can we change rules that mandate the use of outdated technology in, for example, 
our recordkeeping rules so that financial institutions can incorporate new technol-
ogy and thus lower the costs of the services they provide? Can we allow more 
experimentation in the way that funds and investment advisers communicate with 
investors? Can we reexamine our assumptions about the types and methods of 
disclosure we require in light of the enormous changes in communication technol-
ogy that have occurred since the federal securities laws were written in the 1930s? 
Can we permit more issuer communication with investors, which perhaps could 
open the door to a back-and-forth style of disclosure facilitated by online chats 
and message boards? These and other innovations in the capital markets often 
require regulatory approvals or regulatory forbearance, both of which my agency 
historically has been slow to provide. 
                                                          
 4. See Gisela Crespo, Man Gets Stuck in ATM and Slips ‘Help Me’ Notes through Receipt Slot, 
CNN (July 14, 2017, 3:07 AM) available at www.cnn.com/2017/07/13/us/repairman-stuck-in-atm-
room-trnd/index.html. 
 5. Id. (punctuation and apostrophes not in the original). 
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The SEC now has a wonderful opportunity to consider its approach to innova-
tion and entrepreneurship. We have just hired our first Advocate for Small Busi-
ness Capital Formation, Martha Miller. She brings a much-needed voice to an 
agency that has not been particularly open to thinking about the benefits that come 
from eliminating regulatory barriers to small issuers seeking capital. It is not the 
SEC‘s job to shift capital flows toward small or emerging businesses; capital 
should flow to the companies—old, new, large, or small—that can best use it. We 
ought, however, to consider whether the rules we have in place have the effect of 
putting a thumb on the scale in favor of large and established companies. Having 
someone at the SEC whose job it is to ensure that the Commission is aware of the 
types of difficulties small companies face in the capital markets is an important 
step. Martha‘s enthusiasm, knowledge, and experience suit her well for the im-
portant job she has taken on. 
The agency‘s opportunity to rethink its approach to innovation also arises out 
of a decade of technological development related to blockchain and cryptocurren-
cies. This area has challenged many regulators around the world, and the SEC is 
certainly no exception. We, along with other regulators, are asking how existing 
rules apply in this space and whether a new regulatory framework would work 
better. If we act appropriately, we can enable innovation on this new frontier to 
proceed without compromising the objectives of our securities laws—protecting 
investors, facilitating capital formation, and ensuring fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets. 
One of the things that makes regulating in this space challenging is that its 
very essence is decentralization. Decentralization is nothing new; it is at the root 
of our economic system. Free markets draw on the talents and knowledge of peo-
ple all across society to produce what society needs. No person or group of per-
sons can serve as central coordinator because such a master planner would be 
inherently less smart and less plugged in than the market, composed as it is of 
diverse individuals communicating with one another in the brutally blunt language 
of prices.
6
 Yet, there is formal coordination too. Corporations, along with individ-
uals, are key players in our markets. By joining together in a common enterprise, 
people are able to combine efforts and talents in ways that otherwise would not be 
possible.
7
 Our securities markets have thus grown up around markets composed of 
individuals and corporations. Corporations issue securities, make the attendant 
disclosures, and have other responsibilities under the securities laws. Our securi-
ties laws are designed with the assumption that every issuer has someone at the 
helm who can authoritatively disclose the relevant material information about the 
organization. 
Blockchain-based networks offer a new way of coordinating human action 
that does not fit as neatly within our securities framework. Satoshi Nakamoto, in 
the white paper that introduced bitcoin to the world, envisioned a ―network [that] 
is robust in its unstructured simplicity.‖ Uncoordinated nodes work together to-
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, Nobel Memorial Lecture (Dec. 11, 
1974). 
 7. See, e.g., , R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (Nov. 1937), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x (explaining the circum-
stances that motivate the formation of firms). 
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ward a common end ―with little coordination.‖8 Other blockchain projects like-
wise seek to build networks that operate organically, without a central organizer. 
Some projects seek to facilitate various forms of authentication to replace tradi-
tional recordkeeping transactions or to allow individuals to interact without using 
trusted intermediaries. The objective of many of these blockchain projects is to 
build networks that run on diffuse contributions, rather than to create centralized 
entities that run networks. In the end, there may not be anyone steering the ship. 
Yet many of these projects begin in a centralized manner that looks about the 
same as any other start-up. A group of people get together to build something and 
they need to find investors to fund their efforts so they sell securities, sometimes 
called tokens. The SEC applies existing securities laws to these securities offer-
ings, which means that they must be conducted in accordance with the securities 
laws or under an exemption. When the tokens are not being sold as investment 
contracts, however, they are not securities at all. Tokens sold for use in a function-
ing network, rather than as investment contracts, fall outside the definition of se-
curities. 
The Supreme Court‘s Howey test, which sprang from a dispute about orange 
groves seven decades ago, is the tool the SEC uses for discerning whether or not 
something is an investment contract, which is a particular type of security that 
includes some token offerings.
9
 A case once only on the lips of eager law students 
is thus now the hot topic in crypto conversations. In a now famous speech, the 
SEC‘s Director of Corporation Finance, Bill Hinman, explained how that case, 
along with Gary Plastics,
10
 has informed the SEC‘s approach to digital assets.11 
As Director Hinman noted in his speech, it is the nature of the transaction that 
determines whether an offering of securities has occurred, not the item being sold. 
The oranges in Howey were not securities standing on their own, nor were the 
groves in which they grew. By contrast, the overall package sold to investors—the 
―opportunity to contribute money and to share in the profits of a large citrus fruit 
enterprise managed and partly owned by [third parties]‖—was a securities offer-
ing and therefore triggered federal securities law.
12
 Purchasers‘ ―respective shares 
in this enterprise are evidenced by land sales contracts and warranty deeds, which 
serve as a convenient method of determining the investors‘ allocable shares of the 
profits. The resulting transfer of rights in land is purely incidental.‖13 The Division 
of Corporation Finance therefore will look to the nature of a token sale to deter-
mine whether a securities offering has occurred, and not just at the qualities of the 
token itself. 
Director Hinman went on to explain, however, that because the token ―all by 
itself is not a security, just as the orange groves in Howey were not,‖ a token sold 
in a securities offering might later be sold in a transaction that does not constitute 
                                                          
 8. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN 8, 
bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2019). 
 9. Securities Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). 
 10. See Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 756 F.2d 230 
(2d Cir. 1985). 
 11. William Hinman, Director of Division of Corporation Finance, Digital Asset Transactions: 
When Howey Met Gary (Plastics), Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto (June 14, 2018) [here-
inafter Hinman Speech]. 
 12. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300. 
 13. Id. at 300. 
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a securities offering.
14
 Once ―a network becomes truly decentralized, the ability to 
identify an issuer or promoter to make the requisite disclosure becomes less mean-
ingful‖ and offers and sales of tokens are no longer subject to the securities laws.15 
Director Hinman‘s speech has provided a useful framework within which 
people can analyze their token offerings in connection with the securities laws. 
The staff is working on some supplemental guidance to help people think through 
whether their crypto-fundraising efforts fall under the securities laws. There is 
also a standing offer for people to come in for so-called no-action relief in connec-
tion with a particular token or project. The applicant for no-action relief lays out 
the parameters of what it is trying to do, and the SEC staff can respond by saying 
that it would not recommend an enforcement action to the Commission based on 
the parameters set forth in the request for relief. 
Of course, the Commission also has spoken indirectly through a number of 
enforcement actions, which necessarily involved finding that the token offerings 
at issue were securities offerings. Enforcement actions are not my preferred meth-
od for setting expectations for people trying to figure out how to raise money. For 
this reason, it is important for the Commission, in conjunction with Congress and 
its fellow regulators, to offer something more concrete and carefully considered. 
While the application of the Howey test seems generally to make sense in this 
space, we need to tread carefully. Token offerings do not always map perfectly 
onto traditional securities offerings. For example, as a recent report from Coin 
Center noted, the decentralized nature of token offerings can mean that the capital 
raised through token sales may not be truly owned or controlled by a company. 
Functions traditionally completed by people designated as ―issuers‖ or ―promot-
ers‖ under securities laws—which, importantly, bestow those roles with certain 
responsibilities and potential liabilities—may be performed by a number of unaf-
filiated people, or by no one at all.
16
 
Additionally, I am worried that the application of the test will be overly 
broad. The Supreme Court in Howey embraced a ―flexible rather than static prin-
ciple, one that is capable of adaptation,‖17 an unwelcome phrase for people crav-
ing clarity. The subsequent application of the Supreme Court‘s decision has fur-
ther added to the ambiguity by diluting factors, such as the prong that asks wheth-
er the investors were anticipating ―profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers.‖18 ―Solely‖ has gotten dropped in the application of this prong. In the years 
since Howey, many courts have instead focused on whether profits are derived in 
effect principally from the efforts of others. This approach has been formulated by 
one appellate court as a question of whether ―the efforts made by those other than 
the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts 
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.‖19 More to the point, the 
Commission itself determined in 2017 that tokens issued by the DAO, a decentral-
ized organization based on a distributed ledger, were securities despite the fact 
                                                          
 14. Hinman Speech, supra note 11. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Peter Van Valkenburgh, Framework for Securities Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, COIN 
CENTER REPORT, 46 (August 2018), https://coincenter.org/files/securities-cryptocurrency-framework-
v2.1.pdf. 
 17. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. 
 18. Id. at 301. 
 19. SEC v Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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Given the role that individuals play in some token environments, either 
through mining, providing development services, or other tasks, the SEC must 
take care not to cast the Howey net so wide that it swallows the ―efforts of others‖ 
prong entirely. In the realm of securities regulation, we often talk of the need for 
disclosure as a means of addressing information asymmetries between the issuers 
and the investors. The ―efforts of others‖ prong of Howey aims at the heart of this 
problem. If the investors are not in control of the enterprise, that is, if they lack 
material information about the operation of the organization, they will need to 
obtain that information from those who are in control in order to make an in-
formed investment decision. 
It is possible that some projects may simply not be able to work under the ex-
isting Howey framework and the applicable securities laws. One cryptocurrency 
project, Basis, has announced that it will shut down operations and return $133 
million in capital to investors due to the difficulty—if not impossibility—of com-
plying with securities regulations given the team‘s vision for the project.21 I am 
not going to comment on what I think about the merits of any particular project or 
how the securities laws apply to it, but my antennae will go up when apparently 
legitimate projects cannot proceed because our securities laws make them un-
workable. 
Ambiguity is not all bad, of course. We might be able to draw clearer lines 
once we see more blockchain projects mature. Delay in drawing clear lines may 
actually allow more freedom for the technology to come into its own.
22
 
Congress may resolve the ambiguities engendered by Howey by simply re-
quiring that at least some digital assets be treated as a separate asset class. Con-
gressmen Warren Davidson and Darren Soto recently introduced a bill in the 
House intended to amend the federal securities laws to do just that, provided that 
the token truly operated in a decentralized network.
23
 Such an approach would 
facilitate more tailored disclosure. Indeed there are others who have argued that 
whether ICOs can fit within the definition of a securities offering does not answer 
the question of whether that is how we should regulate them. In a forthcoming 
paper, Georgetown Law professor Chris Brummer and his co-authors argue that 
ICOs have certain features that make the regulatory framework applicable to IPOs 
inappropriate.
24
 For example, changes to the blockchain may have outsized effects 
on certain tokens that depend on it. An investor may need to understand, for ex-
ample, how the blockchain can be changed, and how those changes would affect 
the relevant token before she could fully appreciate the risks of investing in that 
crypto asset. 
                                                          
 20. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 
The DAO, Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017). 
 21. Nader Al-Naji, BASIS BLOG (Dec. 13, 2018), www.basis.io. 
 22. See, e.g., Dan Morehead of Pantera Capital on Why this Crypto Winter is Different, 
UNCONFIRMED (approximately 14:25) (Feb. 1, 2019), unconfirmed.libsyn.com/dan-morehead-of-
pantera-capital-on-why-this-crypto-winter-is-different-ep058 (discussing potential advantages in 
regulatory delay). 
 23. Token Taxonomy Act, H.R. 7356, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 24. See C. Brummer et al., What Should be Disclosed in an Initial Coin Offering, CRYPTOASSETS 
(forthcoming). 
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There is also the fact that much of the relevant—in the terms of securities 
law, arguably ―material‖—information about a token is often found in a white 
paper. The terms of this paper may be highly technical and difficult for most in-
vestors to understand. In some cases, these white papers have not matched the 
tokens‘ actual code.25 Whether this is due to honest error, as may be the fact in 
some cases, or outright fraud, as it has been in others, it raises a unique issue for 
regulators to address. 
Much as we regulators hate to admit it, we ought not to assume that absent 
the application of the securities laws to the world of tokens, there would never be 
any order. As Professor Lambert notes in his book, the disclosure approach built 
into the securities laws is designed to ―prevent adverse selection by requiring in-
formationally advantaged parties to share specified information with their coun-
terparties.‖26 As he explains, however, even in the absence of government direc-
tives, the informationally advantaged party may not need the government to tell it 
to make disclosures.
27
 The market itself sends this message; disclosure is a way to 
signal quality, something you want to do when you are trying to convince some-
one to buy your product. After an initial period of unbridled enthusiasm over 
ICOs, cooler heads seem to be thinking about ways to assess ICOs—to separate 
the wheat from the chaff. Sponsors of ICOs that want to succeed will make volun-
tary disclosures to signal their quality. Disclosure will happen regardless of 
whether the securities disclosure regime applies to ICOs. Moreover, the platforms 
that trade cryptocurrencies can play a role in forcing such disclosures, much as the 
stock exchanges did before the securities laws took effect.
28
 
Our interactions with cryptocurrencies are not limited to questions about the 
regulation of token sales and disclosures. Closely linked to the question of wheth-
er tokens are securities is the question of how the platforms on which tokens trade 
should be regulated. Some of these platforms want to register with us, and I am 
eager to make progress on this front. There are features of crypto trading plat-
forms that may differ from exchanges or alternative trading systems designed for 
traditional securities. To identify how regulation may need to change to accom-
modate these differences, we will need to improve our understanding of how the 
platforms operate. 
There is also great interest in exchange-traded products based on bitcoin or 
other cryptocurrencies. As I have mentioned in the past, I am concerned that our 
approach with respect to such products borders on merit-based regulation,
29
 which 
means that we are substituting our own judgment for that of potential investors in 
these products. We rightfully fault investors for jumping blindly at anything la-
beled crypto, but at times we seem to be equally impulsive in running away from 
anything labeled crypto. We owe it to investors to be careful, but we also owe it to 
them not to define their investment universe with our preferences. 
I would like to conclude by drawing again from Professor Lambert‘s book. 
His definition of ―regulation‖ as ―any threat-backed governmental directive aimed 
                                                          
 25. See S. Cohney et al., Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUMBIA L. REV. 591 (2019) (noting the 
discrepancies between white papers and the code they purport to describe). 
 26. Lambert, supra note 1, at 197. 
 27. Id. at 201–07. 
 28. See id. at 212–13. 
 29. Hester Peirce, Commissioner Securities and Exchange Commission, Dissent of Commissioner 
Hester M. Peirce to Release No. 34-83723 (Jul. 26, 2018). 
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at fixing a defect in ‗private ordering‘ . . .‖ reminds us of the gravity of the regula-
tor‘s task.30 Private ordering is the baseline because, as the book explains, ―when 
property rights are well defined and transferable, and individuals are able to strike 
trustworthy exchange agreements, markets will emerge and channel productive 
resources to … [the] production of the goods and services individuals value 
most.‖31 Regulation involves overruling private arrangements, substituting a gov-
ernment mandate, and imposing a penalty of some sort on people who fail to 
comply with that mandate. Given the potential consequences of doing these 
things, the regulator and the people on whose behalf it regulates must think care-
fully about whether and how regulation should be employed. 
That careful thinking, however, may mean frustration for the innovators hop-
ing for quick answers about what the relevant regulations are. Channel that frus-
tration by coming and talking to us about how you think we should approach these 
regulatory questions.
32
 Sometimes I feel like the repairman in the ATM sending 
slips of paper to the outside world asking for help. In my case, I am asking for 
help on getting the regulations right so that innovators and entrepreneurs can 
spend their time and attention on making better products, providing better ser-
vices, and revolutionizing the way we interact with one another. 
                                                          
 30. Lambert, supra note 1, at 4. 
 31. Id. at 16. 
 32. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/finhub (providing a way 
for the public to contact the agency). 
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